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ENEMY VESSELS AND CARGO 
THE "BLONDE" AND OTHER SHIPS 
([1922] 1 A. C. 313) 
ON APPEAL FROl\1 THE PRIZE COURT, ENGLAND 
Prize court-Outbreak of war-German ships detained in British 
ports-Requisition-Owners' rights to release-Applicability of 
Hague convention-German misconduct of war-Effect of peace 
treaty-Treaty of Versailles, Part VIII, annex 3, article 1; 
Part X, article 297-Hague convention No. VI, articles 1, 2, 6. 
Article 2 of Hague convention No. VI, provided that a belligerent 
may not confiscate an enemy merchant ship detained in the 
belligerent's port at the commencement of hostilities, but 
may "merely detain it, on condition of restoring it after the 
war, without payment of compensation, or he may rertuisi-
tion it on condition of payment of compensation." 
The applicability of the above article between two belligerents does 
not depend upon whether they have mutually agreed to 
allow days of grace as contemplated in article 1; article 2 
is obligatory, while article 1 is optional. Whatever may 
be the true meaning of the condition in article 6 that the 
convention is to apply only "if all the belligerents are 
parties," Great Britain during the recent war frequently 
recognized that the convention was binding, and thereby 
waived the right to rely upon nonfulfillment of the condition. 
The conduct of Germany during the war in committing many acts 
in flagrant defiance of th~ Hague conventions does not pre-
vent article 2 of the sixth convention from being binding 
upon Great Britain. Apart from considerations of munic-
ipal law, it is not the function of a prize court, as such, to 
be a censor of the general conduct of a belligerent, as distinct 
from his dealings in the particular matters before the court, 
or to sanction disregard of solemn obligations by one bellig-
erent because it reprehends the whole behavior of the other. 
Where a detained ship has been requisitioned under Order XXIX of 
the Prize Court Rules, 1914, and sunk, the German owneJ, if 
entitled to restoration under article 2, is entitled to the 
appraised value as the compensation provided for by 
article 2, and that right exists although the ship was sunk 
by German hostile action. 
Part VIII, annex 3, article 1, of the treaty of Versailles operates to 
transfer to the allied and associated powers the propert~T 
in all German ships of 1,600 tons and upward. The former 
owners of ships of that tonnage therefore have no locus 
standi before the prize court under article 2 of the sixth 
convention, nor right to discuss how those powers may deal 
inter se with the ships. But annex 3 effects no transfer of 
ships of lesser tonnage, at least until selected for surrender. 
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Article 297 of the treaty does not annul or modify the obligations 
under the convention. The claim of Great Britain there-
under to retain ships to the release of which the German 
owners are entitled under article 2 of the convention is not 
one for determination by the prize court, but orders of the 
prize court for release should contain a provision to prevent 
rights under the treaty from being defeated. 
Three ships, each of under 1,600 tons gross, owned by a Danzig 
corporation and detained in a British port at the commence-
ment of hostilities, were requisitioned under Order XXIX 
for the service of the Crown; while so requisitioned one of 
the ships was lost by grounding, and one by German 
hostile action. Applying the various considerations above 
stated, an order was advised that the appraised value of 
the two lost ships, and the ship remaining in specie, be 
released to the custodian of enemy property to be de-
livered to the Danzig corporation, if after six months no 
proceedings had been begun for delivery to the Crown, 
otherwise to abide the final determinations of those pro-
ceedings. 
Judgment of the prize court [1921] P. 155 reversed. 
Further advised, on petitions, that certain German ships of 1,600 
tons gross and upward detained as above should be re-
leased to the Crown, the orders for detention being dis-
charged. 
Appeal from a judgment of the admiralty division (in 
prize) delivered on January 23, 1921; 1 also, petitions 
and cross petitions for the release or condemnation of 
enemy ships. 
The appellants, a corporation registered at Danzig, 
appealed from a decree of the president (Sir Henry Duke) 
condemning the steamships Blonde, Hercules, and Prosper. 
The ships were registered at Danzig, and were respec-
tively of 613, 1,095, and 759 tons gross. They were 
seized in British ports in August, 19~4, upon the com-
mencement of hostilities with Germany. In January, 
1915, the prize court made orders in the form in The 
Chile 2 f<;>r the detention of the ships until further orders. 
They were requisitioned for the service of His Majesty 
by orders made by the prize court under Order XXIX 
of the Prize Court Rules, 1914. While under requisi-
tion the Blonde had been lost by grounding and the . 
Hercules \Vas sunk by an enemy torpedo. 
Upon application by the procurator general in 1920 
for condemnation of the ships, the president (Sir Henry 
Duke) held that the special provisions in the treaty of 
Versailles as to Danzig left the appellants, for. the pur-
1 [1921] P. 155. 2 [1914] P. 212. 
T'HE BLONDE AND OT'HER SHIPS 
pose under consideration, in the same position as if 
they had remained German subjects; and, follo\ving 
his decision in The Marie Leonhardt/ he held that in 
the absence of agreement between Great Britain and 
Germany to the contrary, German merchant ships 
found in British ports at the commencement of hostili-
ties were subject to condemnation. The learned presi-
dent accordingly condemned the ships; the present 
appeal was from that decree. 
There were also before the privy council petitions and 
cross petitions relating to the Gutenfels and certain other 
German steamships. In the case of each of these ships 
the privy council upon appeal 4 had made order, similar 
to the order in The Ohile,S for detention until further 
orders. The present petitions and cross petitions were 
on the part of the respective owners for the release of 
the ships, and on the part of the Crown for their con-
demnation. Each of these ships was of over 1,600 tons 
gross. The arguments were heard together with those 
in the appeal, and the present judgment of the judiciar 
committee in the appeal deals also with the petitions and 
cross petitions. 
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The Hague Convention, 1907, No. VI, provided (intertio~a~¥~Conven 
alia) as follows: 6 Article 1: ''When a merchant ship 
belonging to one of the belligerent powers is at the 
commencement of hostilities in an enemy port, it is 
desirable that it should be allow·ed to depart freely, 
either imn1ediately, or after a reasonable number of 
days of grace * * * " Article 2: "A merchant ship, 
which, O\ving to circumstances beyond its control, n1ay 
have been unable to leave the enemy port \Vithin the 
period contemplated in the preceding article, or which 
\Vas not allowed to leave, may not be confiscated. The 
belligerent may merely detain it, on condition of re-
storing it after the v;ar, \Vithout payment of compensa-
tion, or he may requisition it on condition of paying 
compensation." Article 6: "The provisions of the present 
convention do not apply except between contracting 
powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties 
to the convention." 
a [1921] P. 1. 
4 E. g. [1916] 2 A. C. 112; [1918] A. C. 500 and 50ln. 
~ [1914] p. 212. 
6 The official English translation aooears in thA Blue Book, Miscellaneous, No. 6 
(1908) I Cd. 4175.] 
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safu~~~ty of Ver- By the treaty of Versailles, 1920, Part VIII, annex 3, 
Article 1, Germany ceded to the allied and associated 
powers all German merchant ships of 1,600 gross tons and 
upward, and an unascertained moiety of certain smaller 
ships. By Part X., Article 297, the allied and associated 
powers reserved the right to retain and liquidate all 
property, rights, and interests witnin their territories 
belonging to German nationals. By Part III, Articles 
100-109, Danzig was constituted a free state, and special 
provisions "\vere made as to property within its territory. 
By Article 105 the ordinary residents of Danzig "\vere to 
lose their German nationality, in order to become nationals 
of Danzig. 
Argument for 1921, October 28, 31 ,· November 1. Sir John Simon, appellants. 
~ 
K. C., and Inskip, K. C., (Balloch "\vith them) for the 
appellants. The appellants are entitled to the release of 
the Blonde, and to the appraised value of the Prosper and 
Hercules under Article 2 of Hague Convention No. VI. 
That article applies whether or not there was an agree-
ment between Great Britain and Germany to allo\v days 
of grace as contemplated by Article 1. That point was 
raised in argument in The Gutenfels; 7 it "\vas alluded to in 
the judgment but not decided. In The Turul 8 the 
judicial committee regarded Article 2 as not being de-
pendent upon Article 1. The appellants' contention on 
this point was not urged before the president, because in 
The Marie Leonhardt, 9 and other cases the president had 
given effect to a different view. Apart from the con-
vention, the diplomatic correspondence between Great 
Britain and Germany during the early months of the \var 
amounted to a mutual agreement to restore ships detained 
in port at the outbreak of war. Article 6 does not pre-
vent the convention from applying. Both Great Britain 
and Germany were parties to it when the ships "\vere 
detained; it is not material that certain countries \Vhich 
became belligerents during its progress \Vere not parties. 
A contrary view \vould lead to curious results, as was 
pointed out in The Jfowe. 10 The convention rested 
principally upon compromise, and could not be expected 
to exhibit the comprehensiveness of a code: Procurator in 
Egypt v. Deu.tsches · J(ohlen Depot. 11 The right to restora-
7 [1916] 2 A. C. 112, 116, 119. 
a [1919] A. C. 515, 518. 
g [1919] p. 1, 
10 [1915) p. 1, 12. 
11 [1919] A. C. 291, 301. 
APPLICATION OF TREATIES 
tion under the convention or agreement is not affected by 
the provisions for the cession of ships and property con-
tained in the treaty of Versailles. By the treaty the 
ships became vested in nationals of the Free State of 
Danzig created by it, and no right to condemn arose till a 
later date. The effect of the treaty was to recognize that 
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· the property of the appellants as a Danzig corporation 
was free from the incubus of German ownership. In any 
case the provision as to the cessi(i)n of ships does not apply, 
since all these ships are under 1,600 tons gross. Having 
regard to Order XXIX, Rule 4, of the Prize Court Rules; 
1914, the appellants are entitled to the appraised value · 
of the ships sunk while requisitioned. 
Sir Ernest Pollock, S. G. (Sir Gordon 1-Ieward, A. G., cr!~~ment for 
and Wylie with him) for procurator general, respondent 
to the cross appeals. The three ships, as enemy ships 
seized in port at the outbreak of war, are subject to 
condemnation in the absence of any agreement to the 
contrary: Lindo v. Rodney.12 There 'vas no agreement 
to the contrary by virtue of either the convention, or the 
correspondence relied on. Articles 1 and 2 of the con-
vention must be read together; article 2 does not apply 
unless an agreement has been made as to days of grace. 
That view was conceded in The Marie Leonhardt 3 ; there 
is no decision of the judicial committee to the contrary. 
Further, the convention did not apply because the con-
dition in article 6, namely, that all the belligerents should 
be parties, was not fulfilled. The United States were not 
parties; nor were Serbia, or Montenegro, all of which 
countries were belligerents. The words ''all the bel-
ligerents" in article 6 can not be limited to those who were 
belligerents at the time of the seizure. That vie'v 'vas 
indicated in The Mowe. 13 The correspondence relied on 
did not amount to the agreement alleged. The essential 
character of agreements of this kind is reciprocity: T he 
Santa Oruz.14 (1) In The Gute71:{els 15 it was said that the 
convention involved a "reciprocal obligation,". and the 
question whether article 2 applied 'vas left open to see 
whether Germany observed her position of reciprocity. 
Germany did not do so. As appears from a communica-
tion to Madrid in October, 1915, Germany planned to 
recover retained ships visiting neutral ports 'vhile requisi-
tioned. That 'vas a repudiation of article 2, ,vhich 
3 [1921] p. 1. 
12 (1782) 2 Doug. 212n. 
n [1915] P. 1. 
u (1708) 1 C. Rob. 49, 62. 
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recognized the right to req~isition retained ships. By a 
note addressed to Sian1 on March 30, 1917, Germany 
maintained, in ans,ver to neutral protests, that the con-
vention was not binding upon any of the belligerents. 
These repudiations put an end to any obligations on the 
part of Great Britain to Germany under the convention, 
or under the agreement, if there was one. Further, in 
the course of the war Germany by her conduct showed 
an intention not to be bound by any convention or 
agreement.16 That released the obligation of this coun-
try. It is not contended that there arose a right to 
· retaliate, but that there ceased to be that continued reci-
procity by Germany which was a condition to the con-
vention being binding. The observations in The Nereide 11 
are therefore not applicable. The appellants were Ger-
man nationals until the treaty made them nationals of 
Danzig; for the purpose now considered they are in the 
same position as if they were still Germans. 
Sir John Simon, K. C., in reply: The prize court is 
not entitled to survey the conduct of Germany to see if 
the sixth convention should be applied. There is no 
evidence that Germany refused to be bound by article 2. 
The claim to retain the ships under the treaty is not one 
for the prize court to determine. 
Upon the petitions and cross petitions there appeared: 
Sir Gordon Hewart, A. G.; Sir Ernest Pollock, S. G., 
with Darby, Wylie, Trehern, Pearce Higgins, and H. L. 
Murphy in the several cases. 
Sir John Simon, l(. C.; Inskip, K. C., and Balloch for 
the shipowners. 
1922, February 10. The judgment of their lordships 
was delivered by-
of Lord SuMNER: These are consolidated appeals from the 
of president's judgment rejecting the clain1s of the appellant 
company for release with compensation and conden1ning 
the vessels in question, the Blonde, the Prosper, and the 
Hercules. They were small German steamers, two under 
18 The record (pp. 34 to 65) contained an affidavit by the procurator general which is of 
historical value. It set out, with particulars as to dates and statistics, misconduct by 
Germany under the following heads: (a) sinking by submarines of merchant ships 
(including passenger ships) and fishing vessels, without warning and with consequent 
loss of civilian lives, including women and children; (b) sinking by submarines of hospital 
ships with loss of life; (c) bombardment of undefended coastal towns by naval forces; 
(d) air raids on undefended towns and cities with loss of civilian inhabitants; (e) promis-
cuous laying of mines and consequent sinking of neutral and other ships; (f) compulsion 
of population of occupied territories to take part in military operations against their 
country; (g) deportation, enforced labour, and unjustifiable penalties inflicted on those 
populations; (h) use of poison gas and liquid fire. Provisions of the Hague conventions, 
1899 and 1907, which werei nfringed by the above acts were set out in the affidavit. 
11 U.Slfi) nra.nch, 388. 422. 
DAYS OF' GRACE 
800 and one under 1,100 tons gross, which at the out-
break of the war happened to be in London and Liverpool, 
and were seized and proceeded against in prize. Orders 
\Xlere in due course made for their detention in the form 
which was settled in The Chile, 2 and followed in many 
cases during the war. Shortly afterv.rards they were 
requisitioned by order of the court for the use of His 
Majesty, and passed into the service of the admiralty. 
Two have since been lost while under requisition-the 
Blonde by grounding off Flamborough Head, and the 
Hercules through being struck by an enemy torpedo. 
The Prosper still remained in the hands of the Cro,vn 
under the requisition order at the time when the case 
was heard. 
The appellants are a shipping company registered and 
carrying on business at Danzig, where the ships also were 
registered, and at the qutbreak of war they owned a 
number of the shares in each vessel, though not all; 
but they have been throughout treated as the full o'vners 
for all present purposes. Danzig having become a free 
city under the treaty of Versailles, the appellants, as 
citizens of Danzig, claim to be in a better position in 
these proceedings than if they had still been subj~cts of 
the German Empire, and no point has been taken on 
behalf of His Majesty's procurator general that, as 
Danzig 'vas not a party to The Hague conventions, citizens 
of Danzig should not be allowed to claim the benefit of 
them. All that is said is that, in respect of Germany's 
actions during the war, the appellants, as they enjoyed 
the benefit, must also take the burden, although, as 
regards disabilities and liabilities imposed on Germany by 
the terms of the treaty of Versailles, they may escape, 
having ceased to be Germans at the moment when the 
treaty first became operative. The principal point is 
one turning on The Hague conventions of 1907, which, 
though not argued below owing to some misunderstand-
ing as to the state of the authorities, must be dealt 'vith 
on one or other of the present groups of appeals. The 
appellants claim the benefit of the sixth convention, or 
in the alternative of a supposed agreement to the like 
effect, arrived at ad hoc by Great Britain and Germany 
in the early months of the war. The procurator o-eneral 
denies that the sixth Hague convention ever beca~e ap-
, [1914] p. 212. 
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plicable, first, for want of ratification by all the belliger-
ents, and secondly, because article 1, on which the 
appellants rest their claim, would only apply if Great 
Britain had put article 2 in force, "\Vhich never was done. 
As to the supposed agreement ad hoc, he says that the 
negotiations were entered into for other purposes and, 
further, broke down without conclusion. 
gr~c~~r or days of The history of the matter is this. Early in August, 
1914, pursuant to an order in council of August 4, a 
proclamation wait issued, which declared that German 
ships in British ports would be detained, but that l-Iis 
Majesty proposed ultimately to apply the sixth Hague 
convention, provided that a secretary of state certified 
before midnight of August 7, that he was satisfied, from 
communications received, that Germany had expressed 
a similar intention. This period expired without the 
receipt of any sufficient communication, and the fact 
was duly intimated to the admiralty. Thereupon, it is 
said, the sixth Hague convention, so far as Great Britain 
and Germany were concerned, failed to come into oper-
ation, and accordingly the provisions of article 2 had 
no effect in the late war. 
Diplomaticcor- In spite of this notice to the admiralty, communi-respondence. 
cations passed between the two powers through the good 
offices of the diplomatic service of the United States. 
Letters and telegrams were exchanged, and sometimes 
they crossed one another. The German Government 
were concerned not merely as to the treatment of de-
tained ships under the sixth convention, but also as to 
that of the crews under the eleventh. They asked 
whether His Majesty's Government intended to observe 
the provisions of these conventions, and in what sense 
they understood some of their obscurer terms. By the 
end of September or the beginning of October both parties 
had stated distinctly that the sixth convention would be 
observed, and had expressed their construction of it, in 
senses which were substantially identical. As to the 
eleventh, though not far apart, it does not appear, on 
the documents which are forthcoming, that they "\vere 
ever in absolute accord. Their lordships were not in-
fornled that His Majesty's Government ever published 
this correspondence at the time as the formal record of a 
ne'v agreement therein arrived at. 
The learned president came to the conclusion that this 
correspondence, vie,ved as a negotiation fo~· a final agree-
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 
ment, never passed beyond the stage of mere negotiation, 
the discussions as to the two conventions not being 
severable and no agreement having been arrived at as 
to the eleventh convention. The contrary was strenu-
ously urged before their lordships. Logically, however, 
there is a prior issue-namely, whether this correspond-
ence wa~ entered upon or was pursued as a negotiation 
in tended to lead to a ne\V in tern a tional agreement at all: 
The treaties and conventions which courts of prize are 
accustomed to construe and give effect to are written 
instruments duly executed and ratified. It is a novelty 
to call on them to spell out such an agreement from a 
series of messag~s passing to and fro. Here there is not 
so much as a protocol, and although no doubt consensus 
ad idem is fundamentally necessary to an international 
agreement, as it would be to a private offer and accept-
ance under municipal la,~, it does not follo\v that in the 
intercourse of sovereign States every interchange of 
messages, some formal and some informal, should be 
deemed to result in a new and binding agreement as soon 
as the parties have reached the stage of affirming identical 
propositions. Each power was anxious to know the 
intentions of the other, and in their lordships' opinion 
their object, and their sole object, was to ascertain 
whether and in what way effect would be given to the old 
agreement-namely, the sixth I-Iague convention, and 
was not to enter into a new agreen1ent dealing with the 
same subject and tending to the same effect, b~t con-
cluded under conditions as embarrassing· and with a 
result as superfluous as could be imagined. 
It is true that expressions are to be found on the German 
side, in the latter part of these co.mmunications as well as 
at the outset, which are not inappropriate to a negotiation 
for, and to the conclusion of, a new agreement. The Ger-
man Government in August states its acceptance of a 
British proposition to release merchant ships, made in the 
order in council of August 4, and in Octo her declares that 
"there now exists between the German Government and 
Great Britain an agreement as to the treatment of mer-
chant ships." These expressions \Vere not, ho\vever, 
adopted by His Majesty's Governn1ent. They through-
out stated their intention to abide by the sixth Hague 
convention, provided Germany \Vould do the same, and 
there are dispatches from Germany at the end of Auaust 
and in September \vhich show that this, \vhich \vas o the 
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real aspect of the matter, was fully recognized by the 
German Government. The language of the communica-
tions, when carefully examined, does not support but 
displaces the theory that a new agreement was·in negotia-
tion between belligerents to effect what could have been 
better secured by rlciprocal recognition of a convention, 
to which both parties had adhered while they were still 
at peace. 
In the result His Majesty's Government became satis-
fied that there existed on the German Government's part 
such an intention to observe the convention reciprocally 
as justified them in proceeding publicly to observe the 
convention for their own part, and thenceforward orders 
were made in the prize court, at the instance of the Crown, 
which were always regarded as being framed to carry out 
the obligations of the sixth Hague convention, while 
securing the interests of this country in the possible event 
of Germany's failing at the conclusion of the war to be of 
the same mind as to her obligations as that which had 
been manifested at the beginning. Their lordships may 
further observe that, on balance of the importance of the 
German merchant ships detained by Great Britain against 
that of British merchant ships detained by Germany, the 
latter power had a strong material interest in continuing 
to execute the convention to the end, and was little likely 
to intend to abandon or to desire to forfeit the ultimate 
advantages, which observance of the convention would 
assure. It therefore becomes necessary to consider in 
what the obligations of that convention consist according 
to its terms. 
Applicability ot Article 6 of the sixth convention of 1907 declares that 
sixth Hague con- . . . 
vention. "the proVIsions of the present convention do not apply 
except between contracting powers, and then only if all 
the belligerents are parties to the convention." The 
French text for the last part of this sentence reads: "et 
seulement si les belligerants sont tous parties a la con-
vention," and there may be significance in the different 
positions in the sentence occupied by the respective 
words "all" and "to us." Of the po,vers belligerent in 
some theater or other and against one combination of 
opponents or another during the late war, Serbia and 
Montenegro never ratified the convention in question. 
The United States 'vere not parties to it at all. At the 
time when the ships no'v under discussion were first de-
tained, Germany had not declared war on Serbia, nor 
EFFECT OF NONRATIFICATION 
had Serbia become formally the ally of Great Britain, 
and, so far as their lordships are aware, actual hostile 
action by Germany against Serbia and actual military 
support to Serbia by Great Britain both belong to later 
stages in the war. A nice question arises, therefore, 
whether· Serbia was a belligerent in such a sense that her 
failure to ratify the convention prevents its being ap-
plicable as between Germany and Great Britain in the 
matter of these ships~ If the position of Serbia does 
not prevent the obligations of the convention from at-
taching, still less can this result from that of the United 
States, who were not one of the "contracting powers." 
To put the point otherwise, are the ''belligerents," who 
are to be taken account of for t_he purposes of this article, 
the belligerents merely who detain or suffer detention, or · 
are they all th~ powers who are simultaneously engaged 
in war, whether acting in alliance or in direct conflict 
with one another or not~ Is the adherence of all the 
belligerents, however remote from each other or uncon-
nected with the ships and their detention, the considera-
tion for the attaching of the obligation of apy one of 
them, or are the mutual promises of the powers con-
cerned-that is, of the detainer and the detained-a suffi-
cient consideration to bind them both together~ M u-
tuality is of the essence of the convention. Is that mu-
tuality complete if the detaining sovereign and the 
sovereign of the ships detained ratify and abide by the 
convention, or is it imperfect, so as to prevent the ap-
plication of the convention, unless and until other powers 
in no way concerned in the ships or their fortunes, but 
merely connected with one or both of those sovereigns 
in the general war, have like,vise ratified and likewise 
abided by the convention, whether or no they have ships 
or harbors, and whether or no they make or suffer cap-
tures or are ever directly affected by maritime war at all~ 
It is very hard to credit that the operation of an agree-
ment, so earnestly directed to the attainment of the 
highest practical ends in "\Var, should have been deliber-
ately made to depend on the accidents or the procrasti-
nations of diplomatic procedure in time of peace, even 
"\Vhen no real relation existed between the condition and 
the consequence, between the ratification of all the parties 
and the detention of the ships of one of them. rrheir 
lordships, hov1ever, have not found it necessary to give 
a final ans"\ver to these questions. Whether in the 
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circumstances of these cases the convention was applicable 
or whether it might be successfully objected that it had 
never become applicable, the result is the same, for ~he 
objection is clearly one that can be waived, and in their 
lordships' opinion it was waived by His Majesty's 
Government, alike by the 'vhole tenor of the above-
mentioned correspondence and by the whole attitude 
of the Crown in matters of prize affecting such cases as 
these throughout the war. De facto as well as de jure 
the position of Serbia and the other powers, as regards 
both the convention and the conduct of the "\Var, was-
well known to His Majesty's Government at all material 
times. Yet days of grace were in fact allowed to Austrian 
ships by proclamation dated August 15, 1914, as to which 
see The Turul. 18 The Chile 5 order was wholly inept if 
the convention had and could have no application, and 
the Crown should have applied to the court not for leave 
to requisition, but for decrees of condemnation. The 
fact that, in spite of the doubt expressed by Sir Samuel 
Evans, P., in The .Mowe10, the Crown acquiesced in 
numerous orders in that form and never asked for con-
demnation of these detained ships so long as hostilities 
lasted, is conclusive to show that any right to rely on the 
nonfulfilment of article 6 was waived. The arguments of 
the attorney general on behalf of the Crown in the case 
of The GutenjeU; 19 and Procurator in Egypt v. Deutsches 
Kohlen Depot 20 are of especial importance in this con-
nection. 
In construing such an international instrument as that 
now in question, it is profitable to bear in mind from the 
outset sundry considerations, which are not the less 
important for being doubtless somewhat obvious. It 
result~ from deliberations among the representatives of 
many powers, in 'vhich none can expect 'vithout some 
concession to insist upon his country's interests, its lan-
guage, or its law. It is expressed in 'vhat is by tradition 
the common language of international intercourse, but 
it would be unreasonable in the circumstances to expect 
of it either nicety of scholarship or exactitude of literary 
idiom. Neither the municipal law nor the technical 
terms of the negotiating countries can be expected to find 
6 [1914] p. 212. 
10 [1915] p. 1, 12. 
1s [1919] A. C. 515. 
1g [1916] 2 A. C. 112, 115. 
2o [1919] A. C. 291, 292. 
INTERPRETATION OF CONVENTION 
a place in its provisions. Where interests conflict, much 
must be allowed to the effects of compromise; 'vhere the 
principles, by which future action is to be guided, are 
laid down broadly, leaving to the powers concerned the 
actual measures to be taken in execution of those princi-
ples, it is unreasonable to expect a greater precision than 
the circumstances admit of, or to reject as incomplete 
provisions which are expressed without much detail and 
sometimes only in outline. 
On the other hand, it is specially necessary to discover 
and to give effect to all the beneficent intentions 'vhich 
such instruments embody and which their general tenor 
indicates. It is impossible to suppose, whatever the 
imperfections of their phrasing, that the framers of such 
instruments should have intended any power to escape 
its obligations by a quibbling interpretation, by a merely 
pedantic adherence to particular words, or by empha-
sizing the absence of express 'vords, 'vhere the sense to 
be implied from the purport of the convention is reason-
ably plain. Least of all can it be supposed that His 
Majesty's Government could have become parties to 
such an instrument in any narrow sense, such as 'vould 
reserve for them future loopholes of escape from its 
general scope. 
Turning to articles 1 and 2 of the sixth Hague conven-
tion, it is important to remember that, before its date, 
and since its date whenever it is not in force, the law of 
nations permitted and entitled a belligerent to make 
prize of an enemy merchantman found within his ports 
at the outbreak of war (Lindo v. Rodney 21). It is true 
that :n several instances during the nineteenth century 
belligerents mitigated the rigour of the rule and granted 
days of grace for the free departure of such vessels. 'l'he 
practice was certainly" modern, but it was neither uniform 
nor universal, and on each occasion it rested with the 
belligerent to elect 'vhether the rule recognized by the 
la'v of nations should be mitigated or not. It is not 
surprising that the negotiators of 1907 got no further than 
agreeing that permission to depart freely, within a time 
to be fixed by the po,ver entitled to capture, was a thing 
desirable indeed, but not obligatory. 
Under these circumstances it is asked 'vith much force: 
Why should po,vers, who could not agree that days of 
21 2 Doug. 612n. 
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grace should be given at all, find themselves able to con-
cur in a more extensive modification of the law then 
existing and to agree that ships, unable to avail them-
selves of permission to depart, should not be made prize 
but should only be detained~ The argument fiQds some 
support in the fact that the article dealing with days of 
grace precedes that limiting the right to such condemna-
tion, and in the further fact that article 2 certainly is 
closely allied \vith article 1 and is so far dependent on it 
that instead of stating the circumstances in which it 
applies, as a self-contained article might be expected to 
do, it finds their definition only in a reference to the first 
article and to those circumstances mentioned in it, which 
depend on the choice and the clemency of the capturing 
power. Why, then, should powers, which fail to agree 
to such a modification of belligerent right as is involved 
in the grant of days of grace, be deemed capable of the 
graver modification which is involved in abandoning the 
right to capture and being intent with a right to detain~ 
The true question, however, is not why they should 
have but whether they have done so, and it may be use-
fully met, if not completely answered, by asking another . 
. The powers, great and small, assembled at The Hague in 
1907 in what was undoubtedly a great effort, involving 
mutual concessions and separate sacrifices, to regulate 
and to humanize the practices of maritime war. Is it 
consistent with their dignity or with the seriousness of the 
negotiations to read a part of their handi\vork as meaning 
that a belligerent need not spare an enemy ship in his 
own port at all unless he chooses, but that, if from good 
nature or improvidence, he waives his right to bar her 
exit absolutely, he is to be bound by convention to do 
more than he chooses to do by express grace, and may 
then only detain, when otherwise he could seize 1 To 
say that the compact expressed in article 2 has been provi-
dently entered into in case two belligerents should recip-
rocally grant days of grace under article 1, but that until 
that event happens it is a mere foretaste of things to 
come, is to attenuate this convention to the very verge of 
annulling it. It is all the more un\vorthy of such an 
occasion to place so narrow a meaning on the article, 
because the length and character of the opportunity for . 
departing in peace rests entirely with the grantor of it. 
In itself a concession requiring immediate departure 
differs only notionally from a belligerent act inhibiting 
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departure altogether. Is the modification of belligerent 
right to take place only in the one case and not ·in the 
other~ and, if so, on what show of reason can it be 
founded or to what inveterate prejudice or ingrained 
self-interest has so illogical an arrangement been con-
ceded~ 
Articles 3 and 4, however, which are strictly in pari 
materia, seem to place the matter beyond doubt. 
Article 3 contains no reference to articles 1 and 2. It 
deals with a case to which days of grace and oppor-
tunities of departure have no application-that is, to 
ships that are found by their enemy at sea on the out-
break of war. The argument is unaffected by the fact, 
that as to this article Germany made reservations at the 
t"ime when the convention was ratified, for the effect of 
the reservation is limited to the article with which it 
deals. A reservation as ,to a part of the convention is 
quite consistent with adoption of the rest of it. The 
article, clearly and indepe;ndently of the others, requires 
that such ships, though by the law of nations good 
prize, may not be confiscated-that is, seized and brought 
before a court of prize for condemnation. They may 
only be detained-of course, under the order of such a 
court and upon conditions imposed by it. Further, 
when article 4 comes to deal with cargo on board "vessels 
referred to in articles 1 and 2," it prescribes the same 
measure of liability as that laid down in article 3, and 
describes that prescription as being an identical prin-
ciple. Their lordships, therefore, think it clear that in 
effect this convention says: "Ships which find them-
selves at the outbreak of war in an enemy port shall in 
no case be condemned, if they are not allowed to leave, 
or if they unavoidably overstay their days of grace, but 
it would be better that they should always be allowed to 
leave, with or without days of grace." In effect, \vhile 
article 1 is only optional, article 2 is obligatory. They 
rsject the construction which makes the prohibition 
upon confiscation depend on a prior election to do what 
article 1 desiderates but does not require. 
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Assuming that the sixth conventio-n was bindin()' on Effect of Ger-
• • b man method of 
this country In the early stages of the war in such a sense conducting war. 
as would preyent the condemnation of these vessels 
at the end of it, the procurator general further contends 
that during its progress Germany has by her conduct 
given this country the right to refuse to be bound any 
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further by its terms so far as German ships are con-
cerned. It appears that in 1915, though the fact did 
not become known to His Majesty's Government till 
afterwards, the German foreign office instructed the 
German diplomatic officials in Spain to inform the 
owners of these detained ships of the arrival of any of 
them in Spanish ports when navigating under requisition. 
The object of this instruction seems to have been to 
give the owners the opportunity of taking proceedings 
in Spanish courts, if so advised, for recovering possession 
of them in Spanish waters under judgments pronounced 
for the purpose. It does not appear whether any such 
proceedings were ever taken, or, if so, with what result. 
Furthermore, in correspondence with the Government of 
the King of Siam the German foreign office had advanced, 
as a ground for refusing to be bound by the eleventh 
Hague convention, that it had never been ratified by all 
the then belligerent powers. Finally, it was contended 
that the many outrageous and indefensible measures 
adopted by Germany during the war, and especially her 
defiance of the Hague conventions applicable, natably 
by the use of poisonous gas and of contact mines, by 
the destruction of hospital ships, the deportation and 
forced employment of civilians, and the bombardment 
of open towns, amounted to an intimation that she 
intended to repudiate all obligations, and especially all 
conventional obligations, as to the conduct of war, and 
thus gave to Great Britain the right to treat herself as 
released from her correlative obligation under the sixth 
Hague convention of 1907. There are two obvious 
fta-\vs in this argument. First, so far as concerns the 
intentions of Germany she may have flagrantly disre-
garded obligations which fettered her freedom of action 
to her disadvantage. It does not necessarily follow that 
she intended to repudiate a convention under which she 
stood to gain largely in the long run. There is, in fact, 
no evidence of any conduct on Germany's part down to 
the conclusion of the armistice which put it out of her 
power to return detained ships in pursuance of article 2. 
Secondly, so far as concerns the consequent rights of 
this country, even if the rules of English municipal la'v 
as to the discharge or dissolution of contracts be appli-
cable to a case arising between sovereign po,vers, repudi-
ation by Germany could do no more than give to this 
country the right to accept that repudiation and to treat 
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the convention as no longer binding. There is no evi-
·dence whatever that this was ever done; indeed it is 
plain that His Majesty's Government continued, do,vn 
to the conclusion of hostilities and even to the conclusion 
of peace, to treat this convention as binding. Most, if 
not all, of the Ohile orders had been made by the end 
of 1916, since which date, as well as before it, Inost of 
the facts now relied upon were notorious, yet no step 
was taken to obtain a "further order" in any case, and 
it is to be observed that the reason for making provision 
for a "further order" was not doubt as to the declared 
intentions of Germany 'vith regard to recognition of the 
convention, but uncertainty as to the continuance of 
that intention on her part. If so, in the language of 
the English cases, the contract was kept alive for the 
benefit of both parties, since one party can not of his 
o'vn choice put an end to it by disregarding its obliga-
tions, and so long as the contract subsists, each party 
can claim the fulfilment of the provisions which are in 
his favor, just as he remains bound to answer for his 
disregard of obligations \vhich he ought to satisfy. 
Their lordships, ho,vever, do not rest their conclusions 
on rules applicable to private contracts in English courts. 
The principle of ascertaining the intention of the parties 
to an agree1nent by giving due consideration to what 
they have said is no doubt valid in international matters, 
but there are many rules both as to the formation, the 
interpretation and the discharge of contracts, which can 
not be transferred indiscriminately from municipal la\V 
to the law of nations. They prefer to rely on a \vider 
ground. It is not the function of a court of prize, as 
such, to be a censor of the general conduct of a belligerent, 
apart from his dealings in the particular matters which 
come before the court, or to sanction disregard of solemn 
obligatio& by one belligerent, because it reprehends the 
whole behavior of the other. Reprisals afford a legiti-
mate mode of challenging and restraining misconduct, 
to \vhich, when confined within recognized limits and 
embodied in due form, a court of prize is bound to give 
effect. In a matter, however, which turns on the obliga-
tion of a single and severable compact, the court must 
inquire whether that very compact has been discharged, 
and ought not to be guided by considerations arising 
only out of the general conduct of 'var. 'I'heir lordships 
are clearly of opinion that neither in regard to the in-
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structions given to the German Embassy in Madrid, 
\vhich were after all a domestic matter and were at most 
a threat never communicated by Germany to His 
Majesty's Government; nor to the answer given to the 
Government of the King of Siam, which not only was 
res inter alios acta but related to a separate convention 
and proved nothing as to the German Government's 
intention to observe Convention VI.,; nor in regard to 
the general delinquencies of the German forces during 
the war, is it possible to find juridical grounds for releas-
ing His Majesty's Government from their obligations 
under the sixth Hague convention, when once they had 
attached. It has not even been sho\vn that on the ter-
mination of the war Germany was not willing to return 
such British ships as she had detained, in so far as they 
had not been previously released under the armistice or 
other,vise. 
It would follow from the foregoing considerations that 
the owners of the vessels in question would be entitled 
to orders of release, but no\V arise the difficulties, that of 
these vessels only one survives, and that all matters 
occurring during the war are, as bet,veen German 
claimants and the procurator general, now to be con-
sidered in the light of the treaty of Versailles. 
Article 2 of the sixth convention, after prescribing that 
the belligerent's right is limited to detention of the ship 
"under an obligation of resto1ing it after the war \vithout 
compensation," proceeds: "or he may requisition it on 
condition of paying compensation." What is this com-
pensation, and when and in what events is it to be paid? 
The question is material, because during the period of 
requisitioning the Blonde was lost by perils of the sea, 
without fault on the part of any one responsible, and the 
Hercules can not now be restored because the German 
combatant forces themselves destroyed her, purporting 
to do so as a legitimate act of war. The provision is that 
a detained vessel is simply to be restored '\vithout com-
pensation. Nothing is said to impose on the belligerent 
any duty to provide for her safety or to effect repairs. If 
he restores her, he does so '\vithout compensation, and 
meantime she has been detained at her o'\vners' risk. 
Next, the belligerent is given an express right to requi-
sition, but on condition of paying compensation. Whether 
requisition has the same meaning in the convention that 
it has in Order XXIX, or whether, in addition to the 
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right to use, it includes a right to appropriate, are 
questions not now material; for present purposes it is 
sufficient to assume that the meaning of the word in 
both instruments is the same. While on the one hand 
nothing is stipulated as to payment of freight or of com-
pensation for the use of the ship while under requisition 
and nothing is expressed as to repairs, on the other hand, 
a-part fron1 circumstances which discharge the requisi-
tioning government from all the obligations of the con-
vention, the exerci3e of the right to requisition during 
detention involves that, if she is not restored at all, com-
pensation takes her place, and for this purpose her money 
value, \vhen requisitioned, is the obvious substitute for 
the ship herself in specie. 
It is no doubt paradoxical that, the ship having been· 
la\vfully requisitioned by the Admiralty without any 
obligation to pay for using her or for the consequences 
of mere use, His ~viajesty's Government should be called 
on to compensate her German owners, because the 
German forces have sunk her by an illegitimate act of 
'var. The question, however, is one of construction of 
the article. It begins by· substituting detention for 
confiscation, thus insuring to the owner the right to get 
his ship back, so far as the detaining belligerent is con-
cerned. On this is engrafted a proviso for the benefit 
of the belligerent, of which he may avail himself or not as 
he pleases, and this proviso imposes on him an un-
qualified condition-that of compensation. This must 
be read literally, and as nothing further is prescribed 
in favor of the detaining belligerent, he can not have the 
benefit of exceptions by implication. The convention 
says that requisitioning is to be on condition of paying 
a compensation; the condition would be frustrated if, 
though the obligations of the convention had not been 
terminated, neither ship nor compensation \Vere forth:-
coming. 
The convention furthermore does not define the com-
pensation, or the mode of calculating it, or the time of 
payment. These are matters \vhich it leaves for sub-
sequent determination, and it is reasonable to infer that 
at any rate the determination of the court of prize, 
before \vhich the vessel in question has been duly brought 
is within the purvie\V of the convention. Accordingly, 
if the recognized procedure as to requisitioning has been 
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procedure provides for the subst1tution of money for the 
ship~ that money can not be regarded as being other than 
the compensation to which the article applies. Under 
the prize rules and orders the court can allo\v the ship-, 
which is in the custody of its marshal, to be requisitioned 
by the Crown, and in the course of such requisitioning to. 
be necessarily exposed to maritime and belligerent 
hazards. This involves the court's parting with the 
custody and with the immediate control. For the· 
security of the owner the court may require the deposit 
or a binding undertaking for the deposit in court of the 
ship's appraised value, and although the court by no 
means parts with its control over the ship for all pur-
poses, or precludes itself altogether from ordering her 
redelivery, it treats the fund for all ordinary purposes as 
the subject on which subsequent decrees will operate. 
The advantage to the owner is obvious. This procedure 
substitutes for such a wasting asset as a ship, \vhi0h in 
either event he can not use, a money fund in court, 'vhich 
possesses a relative stability and suffers no 'vear and 
tear. Their lordships' conclusion is that under the 
sixth convention the subjects to be restored are the 
Prosper, being a ship which is in specie, and the ap-
praised values of the Blonde and Hercules, which were 
lost. No question as to freight was raised before their 
lordships. 
A further point may be briefly disposed of. It was. 
that in all cases where a ship is requisitioned other\vise 
than "temporarily" under rule 6 of Order XXIX, the 
substitution of the appraised value for the ship is defini-
tive, and no order can thereafter be made to take the 
ship herself out of the possession of the Ad1niralty. There 
is no authority for this. It is not supported by the 
special provision for a temporary, as distinguished from a 
general and indeterminate, requisitioning, 'vhich 'vas 
only introduced by amendment into Order XXIX some 
considerable time after the beginning of the 'var, nor 
does the provision that such requisitioning may be without 
appraisement preclude the po,ver of ordering appraise-
ment, 'vhen on the destruction of the vessel it becon1es 
necessary that a fund should be determined 'vhich \vill 
represent her. It is opposed to the nature of requisi-
tioning, \vhich is for the use of His ~1ajesty (including, no· 
doubt, consumption in the case of goods "-hose normal 
usc consists in using the1n up), and \Vould confound a. 
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thing requisitioned for use with a thing acquired for the 
purpose of sale. Furthermore, in cases where release 
in specie is the right of a claimant, the court might prove 
to have disabled itself from making the due decree, if a 
mere order for leave to requisition were to operate as a 
final abandonment to the Crown. Apart from the treaty 
of Versailles, their lordships conclude that the Prosper 
must, as a matter of form, be restored by the Admiralty to 
the custody of the marshal, in order that she may be 
released to the o\vners in specie. . 
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The provisions of the treaty of Versailles, which are saJI~~ty of Ver· 
invoked to the contrary, are t¥.rofold. There can be no 
doubt that. Germany v1as competent, on behalf of those 
nationals who were Gern1an subjects \Vi thin the operation 
of the treaty, to make cessions which would bind them 
and effect a transfer of their rights of property, as if the 
cession had been made personally by the owner concerned. 
By article 1 of annex 3 of Part VIII of the treaty Ger-
many ceded to the allied and associated powers all vessels 
of 1, 600 tons gross and upward and a part of those 
under 1,600 tons_, and by paragraph 8 she further" waived 
all claims of any description against the allied and asso-
ciated governments or their nationals in respect of the 
detention, employ1nent, loss or damage of any German 
ships," \Vith an exception not no\V material. By article 
440 Germany further recognized as valid and binding 
all decrees and orders concerning German ships and goods 
made by any prize court of any of the allied and associated 
powers. 
In their lordship's opinion, while annex 3 operates to 1 .i'o8~~~~~ 
transfer the property in all ships of 1,600 tons gross and 
upward, it makes no such transfer in the case of ships of 
less tonnage, at least until they have been selected for 
surrender as part of those which under the treaty are to 
be handed over. It is not suggested that the vessels in 
question have been so selected, and accordingly in their 
case this provision of the treaty does not affect the 
owners' rights to restoration in specie. Had they been 
over 1,600 tons, the property and rights of the o\vners 
would have been transferred by the operation of the 
treaty and they would have had no locus standi to 
appeal against any order dealing with them or \vith the 
money in court or to be brought into court after appraise-
ment in substitution for them. Article 1 of the annex 3 
to Part VIII, being a cession by the German Govern-
ment, "so as to bind all other persons interested," not 
ov er 
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only binds the German shipowners as persons interested 
in appraised values brought into or to be brought into 
court, but also binds them in respect of their property 
in the ships, which, until duly divested by a decree 
having that effect, remains in them, even though it may 
be liable to be divested at any time; accordingly it would 
be an answer both in regard· to detained ships still in 
specie, whether remaining in the custody of the court 
or under requisition, and to the funds, which. represent 
them under the practice of the court. 
Their lordships further think that paragraph 8 does 
not affect the matter. It would be otherwise if the 
appraised value were regarded, not as a substitution for 
the requisitioned res, taking its place when lost, but as 
a payment in consideration of being allowed to requisi-
tion at all, for in that case there might be a claim, which 
paragraph 8 would bar. Their lordships, however, reject 
this view. The owners of these detained ships have no 
claim against His Majesty's Government either for de-
taining or for using the vessels. Both were regular pro-
ceedings taken as of right under regular decrees the 
validity of which Germany recognizes by the treaty of 
peace. The loss of the vessels gave no claim, for the · 
owners' rights a~ise not out of the loss but out of the 
substitution of the appraised values for the ships, the 
release of which is the indemnity which the convention 
provides for. There is, therefore, in this case nothing 
to waive. 
The treaty of Versailles contains a further provision 
(art. 297) not specially applicable to shipping by which 
the allied and associated powers reserve the right to 
retain and liquidate ·all property within their territories 
belonging to German nationals or companies controlled 
by them at the date of the coming into force. of the treaty, 
the liquidation to be carried out in accordance 'vith the 
laws of the allied or associated state concerned. It has 
been urged on the · one hand and denied on the other 
that an answer can be found to the claim of the Danziger 
Rederci Aktien-Gesellschaft for the release of these ves-
sels in the application of · this article to the ships and 
funds in question. Beyond observing that the conten-
tions raised on both sides deserve full and careful consid-
eration by the appropriate tribunal, their lordships do 
not feel called upon to express any opinion about them, 
for they are satisfied that the prize court is not such a 
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tribunal. Nor do the terms of the armistice affect the 
matter. It is enough to say that article 30, which was 
cited, doss not purport to touch the obligations of the 
Crown under the sixth Hague convention, when duly de-
termined by a court of prize, whether before or after 
the conclusion of hostilities. It merely put it out of 
the po"\\Ter of Germany, when delivering the ships de-
manded, to insist on an anticipation of the actual end 
of the war by delivery of the detained German shipR 
forthwith. 
As soon as the conclusion has been arrived at that 
under the treaty obligations of 1907 this country is bound 
to restore the res, whether now existing in specie or only 
n the form of a substituted fund, the duty of the prize 
court prima facie is to give effect to that obligation and 
thereby to discharge itself and its officials from further 
custody of or control over it. The decision of course 
involves ar_ duty to ascertain that the private party claim-
ing is a party presently entitled, who has not, by his own 
act or by the public act of those \vho bind him, been 
divested of his rights of owner~hip or of possession. 
Where rights and claims arise out of the way in which the 
prize has been dealt with prior to the decree for its release 
and the execution of that decree, no doubt the prize 
court retains its jurisdiction over them, notwithstanding 
that the res no longer remains in its custody. Here, how-
ever, there is no such case. Whatever rights may have 
been r_eserved to His Majesty, as one of the allied and 
associated powers, to liquidate these ships or their value, · 
they have not, so far as their lordships have been in-
formed, been hitherto put in force. The right referred to 
is not the right, existing independently of and prior to the 
convention of 1907, to claim condemnation of these ships 
in prize in accordance with the law of nations, nor is the 
reservation of it equivalent to the discharge of the restric-
tions, which the sixth convention imposes. It is a right 
to liquidate in accordance 'vith municipal law, that is to 
say a ne\v right, which does not become effective unless 
and until it is exercised. If this were to be done hereafter, 
it would be a new act not arising out of dealings with the 
prize as prize, not modifying the rights of ownership as 
they now exist, and therefore it would be cognizable by 
some other tribunal. Their lordships are clearly of 
opinion that the treaty of Versailles, which neither names 
33474-251--11 
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nor seems to consider the sixth Hague convention, does 
not in this article modify or annul the obligations \vhich 
arise under it. So much they decide, but no more: the 
rest is open and, apparently, in accordance '\\rith the terms 
29~ffect of article of article 297, is cognizable by the high court of justice. 
Derision. 
As this potential claim has been brought to their lord-
ships' attention, they think that under any order of 
release the res should not be removed out of British terri-
tory for a reasonable time, lest otherwise the treaty right 
might be defeated; but they see no reason for delaying the 
grant of a decree for release, since no ground remains for 
continuing the responsibilities of the prize court or pro-
longing its possession. The right course will be to 
release the res physically to the public trustee as custo-
dian of enemy property, or to such other officer as may be 
discharging such duties, to be retained by him for a 
reasonable time free of expense to the claimants, say for 
six months, in order that the Cro\vn may have the oppor-
tunity of commencing proceedings if so advised, and in 
that case further until the final determination of those 
proceedings, but in any other case to be thereafter forth-
with delivered up to the claimants. 
It is unnecessary to express any opinion as to the 
appellants' claim to a special position as a company 
registered in and under the la"\vs of the Free City of 
Danzig except as to one point. It was urged that a 
court of prize can condemn only as against an enemy 
subject. Conceding that the power is exercisable after 
·the conclusion of peace, it \Vas said only to apply to those 
whose allegiance or citizenship is the same as it \Vas 
before that time, though peace has converted enmity into 
amity; hence as against the subject of a ne\vly constituted 
State, though formerly they were German, the right to 
condemn has ceased. The contention was not rested 
on any authority, nor was it explained why proceedings 
which were regular from the beg~nning should be frus-
trated as against the captors by a stipulation in the 
treaty, which does not deal with their rights but is 
directed to another and a very different object. Their 
lordships think the contention groundless. 
In the result the appeals succeed with costs; the 
decrees of condemnation should be set aside; the matter 
should be remitted to the prize court to make such orders 
as may be necessary for the appraisement of the Blonde 
and the Hercules, and to make a decree releasing those 
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appraised values and the Prosper in specie to the cus-
todian of enemy property to be delivered up to the 
claimant~, if after the lapse of six months no proceedings 
have been begun for an order for delivery up to the 
Cro\vn but other\vise to abide the final determination 
' of such proceedings. There is also an appeal by leave 
from the president's refusal of a rehearing, as to \vhich 
nothing need be said beyond formally dismissing it. 
Their lordships will ·hun1bly advise His Majesty , ac-
cordingly. 
The Rabenfels, the Werdenfels, the Lauterfels, the Aenne 1,~~~~~ 
Riclcm-ers, the Gutenfels, the Barenfels, the Prinz Adalbert, 
the J(ronprinsessin Cecilie. 
In these cases their lordships, at various dates in the 
earlier part of the \var, made orders on appeal that the 
ships should be detained until further order.22 All were 
over 1,600 tons. 
The owners in the first, second, third, fifth, and sixth 
no\v petition that orders be made for the release of such 
as remain and for pay1nent of the appraised values of 
such as are lost, \vhile the Crov1n petitions in all that 
orders condemning both may be made. 
The relevant considerations have been fully dealt \vith 
in the case of the Blonde and other ships. In the case 
of ships of this size the treaty of Versailles operates as 
a transfer of the former O\\rners' rights, nor have they 
any locus standi before the board to discuss how the 
allied and associated po\vers may deal \Vith them inter 
se. The petitions for release should be dismissed with 
costs. 
As their lordships understand that I-Iis Majesty's 
Government have come to arrangements \Vith the allied 
and associated powers \vith regard to the shipping sur-
rendered and transferred under the treaty, and that no 
question no\v arises as bet,veen them in relation thereto, 
they think that the proper course is to discharge the 
orders for detention previously advised by their lord-
ship~; and to release the vessels to the Cro\vn as the-
present O\vner. 
Their lordships will humbly advise I-Iis Majesty ac-
cordingly. 
Solicitors for shipo\vners (appellants and on petitions) :. 
Bot terell & Roche. 
Solicitor for procura.tor general: Treasury solieitor. 
n E.g. [1916] 2 A. C . 112; [1918] A. C. WO and .50ln. 
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THE "ZUIDERZEE" AND THE "GOUWZEE" 
April 27, 1917 
([1] Entscheidungen des Oberprisengerichts in Berlin, 305) · 
In the prize matter concerning the Dutch steam tugs 
.Zuiderzee and the Gouwzee, together with four lighters, 
the imperial superior prize court in Berlin in its session of 
April 27, 1917, held as follows: 
The appeals against the judgment of the pri~e court 
in Hamburg of January 26, 1917, fail. The claimants to 
bear the costs of the appeal. 
Reasons: 
On September 28, 1916, two tugs, the Dutch tug 
Statement of Zuiderzee, \vith the Belgian lighters, L' Avenir and Pays the facts. 
Bas, and the Dutch tug Gouwzee, 'vith the Dutch lighters 
S. 0. 0. 17 and S. q. (}. 18, "\Vere stopped by German 'var 
vessels and brought into Zebrugge. The lighters were 
empty. The Belgian craft 'vere turned over to the 
Marine Corps in Bruges in accordance with article 46, 
section 2, of the Price Court Rules. The form of the 
barges, which were being taken to London, is the distinct 
build of the "Thames barges" as they are used in Lon-
don Harbor. 
In response to the published notice of the imperial 
prize court in Hamburg, the following appearances were 
made for the release of tl{e vessels and indemnification: 
1. The firm of L. Smit '& Co., as owners, for the t'v<? 
steam tugs. 
2. The merchant, L. Letzer, formerly of Antwerp, no'v 
of Rotterdam, for the Belgian lighter. 
3. The Scheepvart en Steenkalen Co., of Rotterdam, 
for the Dutch lighter. 
The imperial prize court in Hamburg decreed the con-
demnation of all the craft and rejected the claims. 
Against this decision the claimants have entered appeal. 
The appeals fail. 
"c~:tiat:n~.'~ s The barges captured 'vith the t"\\'"O stean1 tugs are con-
ditional contraband according to article 23, section 9, of 
the Prize Code. Their destination 'vas London, and the 
judge of first instance is of the opinion that the pre-
sumption of their destination for the enemy Government 
or military force arising therefrom has not been disproved. 
On this ground he reached the conclusion that not only 
the barges themselves but the tugs as 'vell were liable to 
condemnation. It is explained that the bar~es 'vere the 
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only "consignment" (Beforderungsgegenstande) of the 
tugs, and were to be considered as their ''cargo'' in the 
sense of article 41, section 2, of the Prize Code. rrha t 
they were not taken on board the steamer made no differ-
ence. According to the aim of the prize la\V, \vhich is to 
prevent the "supply" of contraband to the enemy, that 
does not matter. If certain provisions of the Prize Code 
read as if the goods n1ust be on board the vessels, like 
articles 35 and 36, there are other provisions again \Vhich 
plainly denote that only the act of supplying is the 
criterion, as articles 39 and 41. 
The fact that it \Vould be absurd to treat a vessel 
which, for instance, \Vas carrying parts of a submarine or 
dock on board differently from a vessel which was con-
veying an entire boat or dock in to"\V to the enemy was 
considered telling. 
That m,ust be concurred in. Under the circumstances 
here prevailing, where the barges \Ve~e then1s~l ves un-
laden, the legal question is not in doubt. According to 
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the statements of the claimants, it is established that to~~~e~ract for 
the barges were given over to the owners of the tugs 
for delivery. According to a generally recognized prin-
ciple of private law, this is the decisive element in estab-
lishing the legal position of to\vs. According to whether 
the towed vessel has been intrusted to the master of 
the tug for delivery to the recipient, or \Vhether title has 
remained in the owners of the former, a contract of 
freight; or a contract of towage, is presented, be it for 
service or for work. Even granted that principles of 
private law are not necessarily controlling for questions 
of international law, yet in this case they have immediate 
significance, inasmuch as the answer to the question of 
what \Vas to be considered as the cargo of the vessel 
can only be gathered from the agreement concerning 
the goods made \vith the owner of the vessel, which 
n1ust be interpreted ~n accordance with private la\v. 
It is unnecessary to raise the question whether it \Vou]d 
be different if goods had been taken aboard the lighters 
for delivery to England at the same time, and if there 
had been the further intention of bringing the barges 
right back to Holland after the completion of the trip 
and unloading. 
Here it is only a question of the conveyance of the 
barges themselves, which comprised the only elements 
of the consignment. It is immaterial \Vhether the ship 's 
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master sto,vs the goods intrusted to him in the hold or 
on deck, 'vhether he suspends them from the sides of 
the vessel, or whether he draws them along after him 
or beside him through the water. 
From the point of view of international law, the barges 
were the goods and the cargo of the tug. Nor does the 
application of article 41, section 2, of the Prize Code 
0~~man Prize do violence to the text. The tugs are subject to con-
demnation in so far as the towed craft were contraband, 
because they 'vere captured for "carriage" of contra-
band. On the other hand, article 33, section 2, of the 
Prize Code has no application to the towed craft. It 
provides that merchant vessels themselves are not to be 
regarded as destined for the enemy forces, etc., for the 
mere reason that they are en route to a fortified position 
of the enemy. But the towed barges are not in this 
case the "vessels themselves," but the" cargo." From 
still another point of view, but for the same reasons, as 
regards the lighters L' Avenir and Pays Bas, it iB not of 
decisive significance that they are of Belgian, and hence 
of enemy, nationality. For they are cargo, and enemy 
cargo is protected by the neutral flag of the tug, provided 
it is [not] contraband of war. 
Presumptio~ of Concerning this last question too the first ]. udge must 
e n e m y destma- ' ' 
tion. be concurred with. The legal presumption of enemy 
destination arises against the lighters in vie'v of the place 
to which they 'vere bound, and what the merchant 
Letzer-to consider his claim next-has adduced in dis-
proof of the presumption is 'vithout significance. The 
assurances of the owners of the craft in litigation can 
naturally pretend to only slight value as evidence. Nor 
are the officials of the firm so disinterested that their 
impartiality and trustworthiness are to be presuppos-ed 
without further ado. Inherently, too, their declara-
tions-including that which the claimant succeeded in 
substantiating under No. 1-are futile, so far as ascribing 
to them any decisive value as evidence is concerned. In 
vain does one ask what induced the merchant, formerly 
domiciled in Antwerp, 'vho no'v see1ns to have sought 
refuge in Rotterdam, to transfer his business, or a part 
thereof, to London. And even if the assu1nption is 
doubtless in point, that at present there is much to be 
earned in London vvith craft of this kind, yet it is equally 
sure that the English military direction or the depart-
ments of civil government of the state stand in the first 
rank as the best customers for means of transportation by 
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water. If the actual facts remain unclear, even in regard 
to what the claimant had only contemplated, it is "\Vholly 
uncertain what the real state of affairs would have been 
if the voyage of the lighters had succeeded. Therefore, 
the legal presumption remains. 
F ll · · h ·th th 1 · f th Claim of Dutch undamenta y, It Is t e same WI e c a1m o e Shipping & coal 
Dutch Shipping & Coal Co. They appear to ~ave an Co. 
establishment in London in connection with their firm 
which was transferred to England, and the lighters might 
have been going to play their part in a business already 
existing-one does not know, to be sure, how long it had 
existed-of a definite character with business connec-
tions which had been established earlier. Here, too, 
however, from what the claimant presents in the way of 
proof, one gains no more than this general idea of the 
possibilities presented. Nor can any conclusive weight 
be given the fact that the transfer of the lighters to Eng-
land was only permitted by the Government upon the 
pledge of the owners to bring them home again within 
six months, and after the English Government had 
guaranteed that no objection would be raised thereto. 
On this point the testimony is rendered nugatory by 
the evidence. Only two, quite detached, statements in 
writing Were presented in transcript. 
If one is confronted at this stage by facts which are 
fragmentary and which have not been cleared up, there 
also fails to be any assurance that the pledges entered 
into at the time of the transfer would have been kept on 
all sides. The embarrassment of our enemy, as regards 
tonnage of all kind, is too well known for one not to have 
to consider the possibility that, with the consent of all 
parties, and without any embarrassment arising for the 
claimant vis-a-vis his government, the arrangement 
might have been changed, as may even have been in-
tended when the vessels were imported. 
The case of craft of the sort in question, under the 
prevailing circumstances, is one sui generis, and it can 
not be decided according to the same rules which apply 
to goods of other kinds, food, etc. 
It is also remarkable that in the assurances of those Condemnation 
affirmed. 
who kno"\V from their own knowledge, only use for pur-
poses of war is spoken of. Use by departments of the 
English Government for other purposes, even limited to 
the proposed period of six months, 'vould be conclusive 
as to the contraband character of the vessels. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
